http://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Califat-et-legitimite-du-pouvoir.html
CALIFAT ET LÉGITIMITÉ DU POUVOIR DANS LE SUNNISME
ARTICLE PUBLIÉ LE 09/04/2015
Par Inès Aït Mokhtar
La question du califat traverse l’histoire de la pensée musulmane, et occupe une place centrale dans les débats effectifs autour de l’organisation du pouvoir. Disparue en 1924 au terme d’une histoire longue et riche de mutations, cette institution connaît aujourd’hui un regain d’intérêt chez les chercheurs, dans la mesure où elle est proclamée comme source de légitimité du pouvoir par ceux qui contrôlent aujourd’hui certaines régions d’Irak et de Syrie, regroupées sous le terme « Etat islamique ». La notion d’Etat est pourtant le résultat de constructions théoriques et politiques relativement récentes, advenues essentiellement en Occident, à l’âge moderne. Son emploi à l’endroit de cette nouveauté théologico-politique dont il est difficile de cerner les contours peut donc surprendre, et il nous invite à nous pencher davantage sur les structures politiques dont elle se réclame afin d’asseoir sa légitimité. Or, celles-ci semblent converger vers le califat comme institution et source de tout pouvoir légitime.
C’est à travers ce prisme qu’il nous faut ici étudier la notion de califat, afin de compléter une approche historique nécessaire par une approche plus théorique qui doit nous permettre de saisir la portée conceptuelle et la signification du califat en tant qu’il est un outil de pouvoir. Pour ce faire, les analyses d’André Miquel sont particulièrement intéressantes, et c’est d’elles que nous nous inspirons ici.
Aux origines du califat : un pouvoir laissé vacant
Comme d’autres articles l’ont ici montré, le califat naît dans des circonstances particulières, celles d’une indécision quant à la façon dont il s’agit de désigner le guide de la communauté après la mort du prophète. Il lui faut trouver un « successeur » et c’est précisément ce qu’est le calife. Le mot arabe khalifa signifie littéralement « successeur », et la légitimité de celui-ci tient à sa proximité avec le prophète, de son vivant. Cependant, des querelles de succession existent dès les origines, et il n’est pas exagéré d’affirmer que c’est elles qui conduiront en partie à la scission qui opposera bientôt le shiisme au sunnisme, comme en témoigne l’épisode historique de la « Grande Discorde ».
C’est donc afin de résoudre un problème politique très concret, celui de la vacance du pouvoir laissé par la mort du prophète, que nait l’institution califale en tant que telle, qui peut être nommée l’institution de la succession. Or, qui dit succession dit possession du pouvoir, et cette question conduit nécessairement à celle de la légitimité d’un tel pouvoir. C’est en effet une constante de toute pensée politique, que celle-ci soit fondée sur des motifs théologiques ou non, que de penser conjointement le pouvoir et sa légitimité. Or, cette légitimité sera ici pensée en regard de la Révélation : la Révélation est-elle close une fois la vie du prophète achevée ou bien continue-t-elle de se déployer à travers l’exemple offert par la vie de sa descendance, celle d’Ali et de Fatima ? Si le shiisme penche pour le second pan de l’alternative, c’est plutôt le premier qui a la faveur du sunnisme, et il nous faut voir comment la clôture de la Révélation rend problématique la légitimité du pouvoir.
Le califat : le pouvoir et la Loi
Si la question de la Loi est ici cruciale, c’est parce que c’est en regard de celle-ci que se pose un double problème, qui permet de comprendre la nécessité du califat : celui de la connaissance de la Loi d’une part, et celui de son exécution d’autre part.
Le premier problème est celui de la tradition et de la nouveauté. En effet, à mesure que la communauté grandit, elle ne se réduit plus au petit groupe qui constituait la communauté des origines, et, de ce fait, elle voit émerger en son sein des situations ou configurations sociales qui n’auraient pas pu exister alors qu’elle était restreinte. Des incohérences naissent alors entre la lettre de la Loi et le tissu social effectif. L’immensité de la communauté rend, de plus, impossible toute décision à l’unanimité (ijma) préconisée dans de tels cas. De ce fait, la seule solution est d’en référer à une autorité supérieure telle que le calife.
Le second problème, celui de l’exécution de la Loi, se réduit à celui de la figure qui exécute la Loi, et donc à la figure du pouvoir elle-même, qui est celle du calife. Or, dans le sunnisme, le choix d’un chef unique dont le pouvoir suprême est institué et reconnu par la communauté est un devoir de la communauté elle-même. Au fondement du pouvoir ainsi, se trouve la Loi, dans la mesure où c’est la nécessité de maintenir et d’exécuter la Loi révélée qui implique l’existence d’un calife. En ce sens, le rôle du calife, en tant que successeur du prophète et gouvernant de Dieu, est de faire respecter une Loi qui n’a précisément pas été édictée ni reçue par lui.
C’est ce rôle de garant de la Loi révélée qui justifie idéalement l’existence du califat, et ainsi, du calife. Toutefois, les modalités de désignation du calife ne sont fixées nulle part, et soulèvent des enjeux redoutables.
Les sources du pouvoir : l’élection du calife
Les théories sunnites répondent au problème de la désignation par l’élection, qui est la seule modalité de choix valide, et par laquelle il s’agit de désigner un chef « apte » et « digne » parmi ceux qui descendent de la famille du prophète, les Quraysh. Dans les faits, pourtant, le principe de cette élection va être maintenu au prix d’une torsion de la réalité afin de la faire correspondre à la théorie, qui va finalement reconnaître la légitimité d’un électeur unique. En effet, bien que le califat soit la chose de la communauté entière, il est plus aisé de réduire le nombre des électeurs, au point que ces derniers se réduiront sans cesse jusqu’à ce que le souverain calife lui-même désigne son propre successeur, se faisant ainsi électeur unique.
Cet appel à la notion d’électeur unique était nécessaire pour maintenant la cohésion de la communauté, même si elle se résume dans les faits à une désignation de son successeur par le calife lui-même, de façon indépendante de la communauté. Pourtant, si cette théorie demeure légitime, c’est parce que, à travers le calife, c’est la Loi révélée qui parle, dont le calife n’est que le garant et le représentant.
L’idéalisme des théories autour du califat
La question du califat, en plus des modalités de son institution, pose la question de son application possible à la réalité, comme toute construction théorique idéale.
Cette tension entre idéal et réalité est constitutive du califat depuis ses origines, et permet à ce titre de souligner combien un appel à la restitution du califat en des situations socio-historiques hétérogènes pose problème depuis toujours. Ainsi, le califat est un idéal, celui des origines et des débuts effectifs de l’Islam. Or, André Miquel souligne combien cette institution a rencontré des tourments, et n’a jamais cédé dans la théorie et en droit, malgré l’institution du principe dynastique ou de l’hégémonie turque, qui l’ont contredit dans les faits [1].
Cette tension entre idéal et réalité est constitutive du califat depuis ses origines, et permet à ce titre de souligner combien un appel à la restitution du califat en des situations socio-historiques hétérogènes pose problème depuis toujours. Ainsi, le califat est un idéal, celui des origines et des débuts effectifs de l’Islam. Or, André Miquel souligne combien cette institution a rencontré des tourments, et n’a jamais cédé dans la théorie et en droit, malgré l’institution du principe dynastique ou de l’hégémonie turque, qui l’ont contredit dans les faits [1].
C’est ainsi que la théorie du califat se caractérise par un double idéal, celui d’un pouvoir unique et d’un pouvoir légitime, c’est-à-dire légitime en regard de la Révélation. C’est la raison pour laquelle André Miquel considère que le califat et ses défenseurs procèdent d’un « idéalisme foncier » [2], et c’est peut-être justement ce caractère idéaliste qui nous le rend si difficile à comprendre.
Conclusion
La question de la légitimité du califat, si elle traverse l’histoire du monde arabo-musulman, est avant tout une question de théorie politique, celle de la légitimité d’un pouvoir qui se réclame d’une source divine. C’est ainsi la Loi Révélée qui en fonde la légitimité et l’unique horizon. Plutôt que de se fondre dans la réalité, c’est à la réalité de se tordre face à la puissance de la Révélation, et c’est précisément ce qui rend cette institution inaudible à des oreilles sécularisées.
De ce fait, le rétablissement actuel du califat dans certaines zones de Syrie et d’Irak pose bien entendu des problèmes économiques et géopolitiques centraux, mais il trouble avant tout nos catégories de compréhension des évolutions politiques, desquelles la transcendance religieuse est absente. C’est précisément parce que la restauration du califat correspond à une restauration de la transcendance religieuse dans les processus de légitimation du pouvoir qu’elle nous est si difficile à saisir.
A LIRE SUR LES CLES DU MOYEN-ORIENT :
Bibliographie
André Miquel, « Autour du Califat et de la notion de légitimité », in. Tiers-Monde, 1982. André Miquel, L’islam et sa civilisation (VIIe – XXe siècle), 1968.
[1] A. Miquel, « Autour du Califat et de la notion de légitimité », in. Tiers-Monde, 1982.
[2] Ibid.
INTERVIEW WITH HAZEM KANDIL – INSIDE THE BROTHERHOOD (PART ONE)
ARTICLE PUBLIÉ LE 08/04/2015
By Margot Dazey in Cambridge, UK
Hazem Kandil is the Cambridge University Lecturer in Political Sociology and Fellow of St Catharine’s College. He studies power relations in revolution and war, focusing on the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America.
Following an MA (2004) in International Relations from the American University in Cairo, and an MA (2005) in Political Theory from New York University, he received his PhD (2012) in Political Sociology from the University of California, Los Angeles.
He is the author of Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen : Egypt’s Road to Revolt (Verso 2012), Inside the Brotherhood (Polity 2014), and The Power Triangle : Military, Security, and Politics in Regime Change (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
He has published articles on revolution, warfare, and ideology in various academic journals and periodicals.
Hazem Kandil received the 2014 Philip Leverhulme Prize, which funds his current projects on the development of the US war doctrine, and the relationship between conscription and democracy in France and Egypt.
Following an MA (2004) in International Relations from the American University in Cairo, and an MA (2005) in Political Theory from New York University, he received his PhD (2012) in Political Sociology from the University of California, Los Angeles.
He is the author of Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen : Egypt’s Road to Revolt (Verso 2012), Inside the Brotherhood (Polity 2014), and The Power Triangle : Military, Security, and Politics in Regime Change (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
He has published articles on revolution, warfare, and ideology in various academic journals and periodicals.
Hazem Kandil received the 2014 Philip Leverhulme Prize, which funds his current projects on the development of the US war doctrine, and the relationship between conscription and democracy in France and Egypt.
Can you sketch an overview of the Muslim Brothers’ creation and expansion and reflect on the concept of “counter-hegemony” that you are applying to the Brotherhood’s history [1] ?
The historical section in my book [2] goes back to the end of the 19th century, since it was characterized by a certain intellectual crisis that still resonates today. Even though Muslims occasionally faced times of weakness, they did not question the cultural and legal foundations of their community. But major changes occurred throughout the 19th century and in Egypt specifically, from the 1830s onwards. For instance, more and more students were going to Europe, especially France and, once back, were telling their community about different ways of thinking about culture, law, everyday life and so on. This led to a new situation, which Albert Hourani refers to as “two spirits in one body”.
By the beginning of the 20th century, when Hassan al-Banna was a young, bewildered primary school teacher, he lived in a community in which parts were becoming more Europeanised, meaning that Egyptians would still consider themselves Muslims but would also adopt what they saw as modernity wholeheartedly. And for them, because both Islam and modernity were valuable, there could be no discrepancy between these two systems of meaning. On the other hand, there were the religious clerics, who became very anxious and intransigent because of these changes, attacking every thing about Western modernity. And this divide persists today in Egypt : you have the liberal Muslims who believe that Islam is in perfect accordance with liberalism, and you have people who strongly oppose any Western ideology.
The Muslim Brotherhood was created at this specific moment in Egyptian history and that is when the notion of “counter-hegemony” becomes relevant. The Brotherhood thought that the two camps were not going to resolve the matter, as it had become impossible for them to listen to each other. On the one hand, it was too late to try to roll back modernity through religious arguments, but on the other hand, they could not just give up to modern secularism. Consequently, they settled to infiltrate society, slowly but surely, aiming at winning people over back to Islamic culture, Islamic lifestyle, Islamic laws, one by one – they were inspired by the imagery of Noah’s ark, bringing as many survivors as possible.
This strategy carries Gramscian overtones : the Brotherhood hoped to counter what was quickly becoming common sense by slowly expanding their Society. Their hope was – and it came to a climax with Rabaa in 2013 – that after creating what Gramsci calls the “war of manoeuvre”, that is, winning over larger sections of society, then the “frontal attack” could take place. It was not necessarily seen as a violent clash but rather a confrontation between two different, parallel communities, culminating in the victory of the more committed. Hassan al-Banna, at the Fifth Annual congress in 1939, specifically told his fellow Brothers : you’re too hasty, you want to move prematurely ; only when we will have enough committed people, we could move to the frontal attack. That is why, I think, Gramsci is useful for understanding the Brotherhood. Of course the Muslim Brothers were not thinking in terms of Gramsci but in terms of the prophet’s tradition, starting with a small community and winning people one by one to finally overwhelm the unbelievers.
This moment of foundation of the Society still resonates with us now and it is important to understand that, throughout their history, the Muslim Brothers were always very consistent with their ideal of generating a cultural transformation.
In the 1930s they thought that the transformation might be achieved through fostering good relationships with the young reformist King and thus they became staunch monarchists. Then after the King turned against them, they took part in the Free Officers’ coup, thinking that, if they could help create a Republic, they would be able to infiltrate the subsequently established media and universal education system. And actually Sayyid Qutb, on the eve of joining the Brotherhood, was a cultural adviser to Nasser. Then Nasser turned against them. When Sadat got them out of prison, they reinvented themselves as supporters of a just dictatorship and embarked on cultural transformation by becoming his advisers. After years of collaboration, Sadat turned against them. When Mubarak came in, he did not want them as his advisers but allowed them to work in the sphere of civil society. Here, the more contemporary version of the Muslim Brotherhood took shape. Working at the level of civil society means, for the Muslim Brothers, running for elections at universities, syndicates, and parliament, with the aim of using the campaign itself as a cultural platform. The same logic applies to their charity work in neighbourhood mosques, nurseries, schools, and so on.
In sum, the Brotherhood’s strategies varied over time but their goal of cultural transformation remained the same. While Hassan al-Banna tried to win people over to a central Brotherhood headquarters, the current Brotherhood attempts to infiltrate civil spaces, without people necessarily being aware that they are Brothers. Contrary to the literature that usually portrays them as opportunists or pragmatists, they are utterly consistent in terms of objectives.
Moving toward more contemporary developments, can you broadly account for the popular uprising that led to Mubarak’s downfall, pointing out the specific role the Brotherhood played in this mobilization, especially its youth wing ?
The Muslim Brotherhood has been working within civil society since the seventies. But after thirty years, many young members of the Brotherhood became slightly impatient and got involved with more direct forms of political protest, such as the united front movements like Kefaya, Facebook pages such as “We are all Khaled Saeed”, or youth movements like the April 6th movement. They started exploring different avenues, which were more subversive and more confrontational.
However, on the eve of the uprising, it was no secret that the Muslim Brothers were sending clear messages to Gamal Mubarak, Mubarak’s son and designated successor, that they would not oppose his succession if he would allow them the same space and freedom within civil society. And so, when the revolt itself took place, the Muslim Brothers were taken aback, since it was out of their field of possibilities and expectations. Many of the youth who were disillusioned with the Brotherhood went on to form several small (and so far insignificant) parties, such as the Egyptian Current, and Strong Egypt, while the Brotherhood famously decided to join the uprising on the night of 28th, when it became obvious that a big change was taking place.
However, it is important to know that, on the 1st of February, the Brotherhood sent Mohammed Morsi, who became president afterwards, and Saad El-Katatni, who became first speaker of the parliament, to negotiate a deal with Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s intelligence officer. Through this settlement, they would try to explain to the demonstrators in Tahrir that things could be solved through negotiations, while in exchange the Brotherhood would be offered a political party and more space. But on the 2nd February, the day after the meeting, the battle of the so-called Battle of the Camel occurred, changing the situation.
As soon as the revolt ended, the Brotherhood went back to asking how they could create their cultural transformation. They looked around to see whom they could work with. On the one hand were the civil activists, this core group of men and women responsible for the revolt, mostly liberal, leftist, with a very strong secular agenda. They could work with the Brotherhood to uproot the old regime but they would not want to see the country Islamised. On the other hand were powerful institutions : the military and the security, which had been the Brotherhood’s enemies for some time but which were not promoting any cultural agenda. So the Brotherhood thought to convince them that they could replace the old ruling party (that has been dissolved and its leaders imprisoned), so the institutions could take the Brotherhood as their new political partner. The Brotherhood thought there would be no clash because the security and the military institutions would not care about what the Brothers are mostly concerned with : culture – in this regard, it is worth noticing that in the first Muslim Brotherhood government under Morsi, the three positions they were really adamant about were : Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Information and Ministry of Education. In return, the Brotherhood could help the security and the military stabilize the political situation and shield them from accountability.
You briefly mentioned the power triangle between the political, the military and the security, which you describe further in one of your books [3]. Can you develop this argument and explain how Morsi’s regime fit within this triangle structure ?
In my work, I try to look at what I refer to as the “power triangle,” the political, military, and security institutions that constitute the core of any ruling bloc. I study regime change through examining the interactions of these three institutions, which are of course embedded in a certain cultural, socio-economic and geopolitical context.
My analysis is that what began as a military dominated regime in the 1950s slowly metamorphosed into a police state, with the security becoming the most important institution on the eve of the 2011 revolt and the military remaining an important, but less privileged partner. Consequently, the military saw the 2011 revolt as a good opportunity to outmanoeuvre its ruling partners and to change the power configuration. They first got rid of the old ruling party and came face to face with the security. Their plan was then to create a new political partner that would not be so troublesome and would defer to the military. The military initially thought about the revolutionary activists and, interestingly, the first governments formed after the revolt included figures associated with the opposition. However, at the end of the day, the military realized that the revolutionary youth was just too destabilising for the country and their next option was the Muslim Brothers, who presented themselves as a good partner : “We know how to defer to powerful institutions, we are not as rash and reckless as these youth, we are organised and we will not cause you any trouble, our sphere of interest which is culture is not your field our interest, etc.”. They seemed like a very good fit.
But what the Muslim Brotherhood did not suspect in trying to fit within this power triangle was that paying respect to the military and the security would not be enough. Famously, the Muslim Brotherhood did not only support the supreme military council in most of its decisions, but also identified with almost all of the security positions : the importance of maintaining order, the discourse on foreign conspiracies, the blame on the revolutionaries for challenging the police, etc. When Morsi came to power, he immediately said that everything was forgiven and forgotten because the security has reformed itself and even right before he was overthrown he went on to declare that the security was a partner in the revolt.
Incidentally, the current interior minister recently said that Egyptians do not have a problem with the security, as illustrated by the fact that the revolution occurred on Police day out of respect – while it is obviously the opposite. Later people found out that this line of reasoning was Morsi’s idea : in one of his speeches, he said that it had been the will of God that the day of the Revolution and Police day coincided.
So, the Brotherhood thought that paying respect to the security and the military would be enough. The problem is that they did not account for the fact that the two political factions they intended to replace could actually unite against them. The revolutionary activists felt betrayed because of the Brotherhood’s attempt to hijack the revolution, while the old regime networks refused to share power when they could reclaim it all once more. And so during the summer 2013 an incredible tactical alliance between the old regime and the revolutionary activists took place, in order to bring down the Brotherhood.
It would be wrong to think that the uprising of the summer 2013 was completely manufactured. The military and the security blessed it, but there were also millions of people in the streets. The revolutionary activists succeeded in agitating against the Brotherhood on their websites and on television and gave legitimacy to the uprising, while the old regime used its own money, networks and bureaucracy to get people out. So, now, the Brotherhood is out of the picture and Egypt’s political institution is still in a state of flux.
People suggest that the military controls the regime but, in my analysis, when Sissi goes to the presidency and leaves the military, he is no longer the parole officer representing the military. He has his own position and legacy to take into account – how he will go down in history books. We have a two-headed regime with the military and the security as the strongest institutions and it is still unclear who is going to dominate. And you have fluidity in the political field. Sissi is trying to build his own camp around the presidency, a faction made of technocrats and advisers, who are not political in any way but who work in a managerial style to achieve his vision. Very much like Nasser, he is trying to turn politics into management. But he is worried because the old regime is trying to get back to power, primarily through parliament. Ahmed Ezz, once the mentor of Gamal Mubarak, tried to run for parliament and of course the “independent” judiciary prevented him from running due to a technicality. But even if he can’t enter parliament, he can still be the caucus leader from outside. Old regime clients and businessmen are planning to run as independents and dominate parliament. And so again the independent judiciary, days before parliament elections was due to start, postponed the elections, saying that the electoral law is not constitutional although constitutional lawyers were involved in drafting it. So Sissi is trying to buy time to solidify his camp, and others are really anxious to get to parliament to solidify their own networks as well. They might come together under the umbrella of one party, under the umbrella of a number of parties, in a coalition. The regime’s character is not yet clear. Military and security are anxiously looking at each other, the political seat is contests, so that it is difficult to predict where the country is going.
The analysis I am conducting here is more complicated and fragmented than mainstream analysis, which states that the Muslim Brotherhood tried to be part of the revolution but was ultimately overthrown in a counter-revolution.
[1] Hazem Kandil, 2011, « Islamizing Egypt ? Testing the limits of Gramscian counterhegemonic strategies », Theory and Society, Vol. 40, No. 1., pp. 37-62.
[2] Hazem Kandil, 2015, Inside the Brotherhood, Polity Press.
[3] Hazem Kandil, 2012, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen. Egypt’s Road to Revolt, Verso Press.
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